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CITE: 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 105 (2014)

RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, LP v. BURNS & LEVINSON, LLP:
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTRUCTS A FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
IN-FIRM PRIVILEGE AND EXPOSES OTHER STATES’ NEED FOR
RENOVATION
KELSEY HUGHES-BLAUM*
“In law, as in architecture, form should follow function, and we prefer a
formulation of the attorney-client privilege that encourages attorneys faced with
the threat of legal action by a client to seek the legal advice of in-house ethics
counsel . . . .”1
I.

LAYING THE FOUNDATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO IN-FIRM COUNSEL AND
THE “CURRENT-CLIENT” ISSUE

Lawyers make mistakes just like everyone else.2 Yet, the unique world of
legal practice, with its emphasis on protecting client confidences, raises the
question: Who can lawyers turn to if they make a mistake?3 Because a lawyer’s
most innocent error can have devastating consequences, professional liability
insurers are increasingly urging firms to hire in-house ethics counsel to advise
attorneys on preventing and responding to malpractice claims.4 A 2005 survey
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Villanova University School of Law. This Note is dedicated to
my father, James Blaum, who has served as a role model and constant source of
encouragement throughout my law school career. I would like to thank my family and friends
for their endless support, and the editorial staff of the Villanova Law Review for their valuable
input and assistance throughout the writing process.
1. RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 (Mass.
2013) (preserving attorney-client privilege for in-firm communications).
2. See Corinne Cooper, Teaching Associates to Make Mistakes, L. PRAC. MGMT.
(July/Aug. 1993), available at http://www.professionalpresence.com/html/articles/mistake
management.php (“It’s time we admitted frankly that attorneys make mistakes. No matter
how hard you work, nor how carefully you prepare, you are going to fumble. Mistakes don’t
end with experience or partnership. Attorneys are only human, and to err is, after all, our
most human characteristic.”).
3. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers Are Different and Why We Are the Same:
Creating Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical Behavior—In-House
Ethics Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 AKRON L. REV. 679, 703
(2011) (describing ethical challenges unique to law firms and inquiring “[t]o whom, then,
should the lawyer raise questions?”); see also Carolyn Elefant, When Lawyers Make Mistakes,
LAW.COM (Feb. 7, 2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005542170&When_
Lawyers_Make_Mistakes&slreturn=20130822180835 (noting that attorneys’ obligation to
protect client confidentiality forces many lawyers to conceal their errors).
4. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1721, 1758–59 (2005) (“[L]iability insurers increasingly are encouraging law firms to appoint
in-house counsel.”); Jeremy A. Gogel, An Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege: IntraFirm Communications About Potential Legal Malpractice Claims, 54 FOR DEF., No. 4, Apr.
2012, at 66, 66, available at http://dritoday.org/ftd/2012-04F.pdf (“With the number of legal
malpractice and ethics inquiries on the rise, law firms have sought to lessen the potential
impact from these actions by appointing one or more members of their firms as general
counsel.”). The Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (ALAS) is a risk retention group that
insures approximately 58,000 attorneys in over forty-five states. See About the ALAS

(105)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 8

106

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 59: p. 105

revealed that seventy percent of the nation’s largest firms appoint in-house
counsel.5 The accessibility of law firm in-house counsel affords attorneys the
opportunity to address and rectify their mistakes before it is too late.6
While the availability of in-house counsel may answer questions
concerning a lawyer’s ability to seek advice, it also warrants further inquiry.7
Prior to engaging in candid communication with in-house counsel, the
thoughtful lawyer will hesitate, wondering: Well, are these communications
protected under the attorney-client privilege?8 Generally, communications
between a firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel are protected under the
privilege.9 Nevertheless, several courts have refused to extend the privilege
where the in-firm communications involved a current client.10 These decisions

Companies, ALAS, http://www.alas.com/public/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2014)
(describing scope of business and services provided). ALAS’s most recent report illustrates
that professional liability claims are an unfortunate yet inevitable byproduct of modern legal
practice. See ATTORNEYS’ LIAB. ASSURANCE SOC’Y LTD., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2012),
available at http://www.alas.com/public/AnnualReport2012.pdf (discussing prevalence of
professional liability claims). In 2012 alone, ALAS saw 8.5 malpractice claims reported per
every 1,000 lawyers. See id.
5. See Rotunda, supra note 3, at 705 (describing results reported by 2005 survey). The
2005 survey results reflected a sixty-three percent increase in firms appointing in-house
counsel from 2004. See id. (noting increase from prior year). Additionally, ninety-two
percent of lawyers serving as in-house counsel were also partners at their respective firms.
See id.
6. See id. at 705–06 (“[O]ne study showed that, over a five-year period, law firms that
employ general counsel . . . spend $1 million less on defense costs and indemnity payments in
connection with malpractice claims. Because these firms are more ethical, they have fewer
malpractice claims.” (citing Anthony E. Davis, The Emergence of Law Firm General Counsel
and the Challenges Ahead, 20 PROF. LAW., NO. 2, 2010, at 1)).
7. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1766 (admitting use of firm in-house counsel raises
ethical questions).
8. See Gogel, supra note 4 (cautioning attorneys and in-house counsel to become
familiar with their jurisdiction’s case law before seeking or giving advice). See generally
Allison D. Rhodes & Peter Tran, The Attorney-Client Privilege May Not Protect
Communications Between Firm In-House Counsel and Firm Lawyers, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L
RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibi
lity/39th_conf_session11_atty_client_privilege_between_in_house_counsel_and_firm_lawyer
s.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2014) (“In light of recent court decisions, lawyers
need to be aware that communications with in-house counsel about a potential legal
malpractice claim may not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.”).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing infirm privilege for associates assigned to internal investigation); Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 850 F. Supp. 255, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding privileged
communications between firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel); Lama Holding Co. v.
Shearman & Sterling, No. 89 Civ. 3639, 1991 WL 115052 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1991) (holding
privilege attaches to in-firm communication so long as in-house counsel is designated as
such).
10. See, e.g., Asset Funding Grp., LLC v. Adams & Reese, LLP, Civil Action No. 072965, 2008 WL 4948835 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2008) (declining to apply privilege due to
conflict between firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and to client); Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v.
Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL 578989 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (rejecting in-firm
privilege based on fiduciary relationship and conflicting interest between client and lawyer);
Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 (S.D.N.Y
2002) (rejecting in-firm privilege); Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle,
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284–85 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (rejecting in-firm
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abrogating privilege in the current-client context rely on Pennsylvania
precedent, the foundation of which has since been highly criticized.11
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was the first state supreme
court to address in-firm privilege in RFF Family Partnership, LP v. Burns &
Levinson, LLP.12 In this landmark ruling, the court rejected prior precedent and
held that the attorneys’ communications with in-house counsel were protected
by the attorney-client privilege.13
While many have applauded the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
ruling in RFF Family Partnership, some have expressed concern that it
“protects the interests of lawyers over those of the clients.”14 This Note
disagrees with critics and argues that this Massachusetts ruling provides a
functional framework for in-firm privilege from which the interests of both
lawyers and their clients are served.15 Part II provides an overview of in-firm
privilege); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 595, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (denying in-firm
privilege in current-client context); SonicBlue Inc. v. Portside Growth & Opportunity Fund,
Bankr. Nos. 03-51775, 03-51776, 03-51777, 03-51778-MM, 2008 WL 170562 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (holding law firms cannot assert privilege against client when
communications arise out of self-representation on conflict of interests grounds).
11. See, e.g., Asset Funding Grp., 2008 WL 4948835 (declining to apply privilege due
to conflict between firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and to client); Thelen Reid & Priest, 2007
WL 578989 (rejecting in-firm privilege based on fiduciary relationship and conflicting interest
between client and lawyer); Bank Brussels Lambert, 220 F. Supp. at 287 (rejecting in-firm
privilege); Koen Book Distribs., 212 F.R.D. at 284–85 (relying on Sunrise in rejecting in-firm
privilege); In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D at 595–96 (refusing attorney-client privilege protection in
case involving current client); SonicBlue, 2008 WL 170562 (holding law firm could not assert
privilege against client when communications arise out of self-representation on conflict of
interests grounds). In Sunrise, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania was the first court to analyze the issue of in-firm privilege. See Chambliss,
supra note 4, at 1728 (“The first case to consider a claim of in-firm privilege was In re
Sunrise . . . .”). After Sunrise, several courts adopted Pennsylvania’s reasoning to circumvent
the attorney-client privilege in current-client cases. See id.
12. See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1070
(Mass. 2013) (“Neither this court nor any other court of last resort in the United States appears
to have addressed the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to a law firm’s in-house
communications concerning a current client.”).
13. See id. at 1080–81 (recognizing privilege for in-firm communications relating to
current client’s malpractice claim).
14. Joan C. Rogers, ABA Formally Backs Privilege in Consults with Inside Counsel,
CORP. L. DAILY, Aug. 23, 2013, at 1 [hereinafter Rogers, ABA Formally Backs Privilege]
(noting Association of Corporate Counsel’s opposition to in-firm privilege in current-client
context). The Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) has argued “clients pay law firms to
serve them as advocates, not fight them as adversaries.” Id. at 2 (describing ACC’s stance
that law firms’ duty of loyalty should prohibit firms from claiming privilege to hide
information from current clients). For further discussion of the ACC’s stance on in-firm
privilege, see infra note 132 and accompanying text. See generally Richard Zitrin, Viewpoint:
Law Firms Gain Secrecy at the Expense of Client Loyalty, THE RECORDER (July 19, 2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202611391549&Viewpoint_Law_Firms_G
ain_Secrecy_at_the_Expense_of_Client_Loyalty (“I have to conclude that courts ruling this
way are simply protecting the interests of lawyers over those of clients, and that is
inexcusable.”).
15. See ABA Resolution 103 (adopted June 2013) (“[T]he American Bar Association
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privilege and discusses how courts had analyzed its application to in-firm
communications leading up to RFF Family Partnership.16 Part III details the
facts, procedural history, and holding of the decision.17 Part IV analyzes the
court’s holding and argues that RFF Family Partnership provides a practical
approach to in-firm privilege that is limited enough to benefit firms, lawyers,
and their clients.18 Part V concludes by asserting that many jurisdictions will
need to rethink their approaches to in-firm privilege in light of Massachusetts’s
improved framework.19
II. THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF IN-FIRM PRIVILEGE: AN OVERVIEW OF EVIDENCE,
ETHICS, AND APPLICATIONS
The issue of in-firm privilege arises out of a complex interplay between the
evidentiary and ethical rules governing today’s legal profession.20 While the
attorney-client privilege functions to promote candor between attorneys and
their clients by protecting certain communications from discovery in litigation,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct complicate the privilege’s application
to in-firm communications.21 Moreover, because law firm in-house counsel
was and still remains a fairly new development, the first court to interpret infirm privilege relied on questionable case law, which resulted in poorly
reasoned analysis.22 More than two decades after the seminal case of In re
Sunrise Securities Litigation,23 courts and critics are beginning to recognize the
weak foundation upon which in-firm privilege has been rejected in the past and
the need for a reconstructed framework in the future.24
recognizes that client representation will be advanced by permitting [in-firm] confidential
consultation . . . .”); see also Justin Fields, Viewpoint: Attorney-Client Privilege Is for
Lawyers, Too, THE RECORDER (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA
.jsp?id=1202615401043&Viewpoint_AttorneyClient_Privilege_Is_for_Lawyers_Too&slretur
n=20130903063815 (recognizing advantages of RFF Family Partnership to lawyers and
clients).
16. For a further discussion of the attorney-client privilege and how courts have
applied it in the past, see infra notes 20–84 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the facts, holding, and rationale of RFF Family
Partnership, see infra notes 85–122 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the public reaction to RFF Family Partnership and how
Massachusetts’s framework serves the interests of firms and clients, see infra notes 123–63
and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of how RFF Family Partnership will impact other
jurisdictions, see infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.
20. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1767 (“Law firms’ reliance on in-house counsel
carries responsibilities as well as privileges . . . .”).
21. See infra notes 25–46 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary and ethical
complexities surrounding in-firm privilege).
22. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1728 (“The first case to consider a claim of in-firm
privilege was In re Sunrise . . . .” (citing In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D 560, 597 (E.D.
Pa. 1989))); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Essential Principles for Law Firm General
Counsel, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 806, 832 (2005) [hereinafter Richmond, Essential Principles]
(describing Sunrise as “wrongly decided”).
23. 130 F.R.D 560 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
24. See TattleTale Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10-cv226, 2011 WL 382627, at *4–10 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011) (noting that any decision relying on
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A. An Evidentiary Infrastructure with Ethical Implications
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the common law privileges
protecting confidential communications.25 The privilege exists to encourage
“full and frank communication” between attorney and client.26 To achieve this
level of candor, the privilege shields attorney-client communications from
discovery in litigation.27
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,28 the United States Supreme Court held
that the attorney-client privilege extends to communications between a
corporation’s in-house counsel and its employees.29 Furthermore, courts have
recognized that when a government entity hires an attorney as in-house counsel,
the legal advice that in-house counsel provides is protected under the attorneyclient privilege.30 Like these other entities, law firms generally enjoy the
Sunrise’s line of reasoning “merits a closer look”); see also William T. Barker, Law Firm InHouse Attorney-Client Privilege Vis-à-Vis Current Clients: Courts Should Reconsider and
Limit the Rule that In-House Communications Are Not Protected Against Current Clients, 70
DEF. COUNS. J. 467, 471 (2003) (noting that flawed Sunrise reasoning has become foundation
for in-firm cases and urging courts to reconsider its application).
25. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm
Internal Investigations: Principles and Perils, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69, 71 (2004)
[hereinafter Richmond, Internal Investigations] (describing attorney-client privilege as oldest
of common law privileges and noting that it has now been widely codified).
26. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (discussing purpose of privilege).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000)
(“[T]he attorney-client privilege may be invoked . . . with respect to (1) a communication (2)
made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or
providing legal assistance for the client.”).
28. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
29. See id. at 403–04 (holding that communications by corporation’s employees to
counsel were privileged). In Upjohn, the communications at issue were made by employees
to in-house counsel in order to secure legal advice. See id. at 394 (discussing communications
sought in discovery). The Court reasoned that it was consistent with the purposes underlying
the attorney-client privilege that these communications be “protected against compelled
exposure.” Id. at 395 (providing rationale for protecting communications); see also Brendan
F. Quigley, The Need to Know: Law Firm Internal Investigations and the Intra-Firm
Dissemination of Privileged Communications, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 889, 891 (2007)
(citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396) (discussing holding of Upjohn).
Furthermore, as within corporations, the attorney-client privilege preserves partnerships’
communications with in-house counsel. See In re Beiter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that attorney-client privilege framework for corporations also applies to
partnerships); see also Richmond, Internal Investigations, supra note 25, at 74 (“With respect
to partnerships, it is generally the rule that all partners are considered ‘to be the “client” in all
attorney-client communications that involve the partnership.’” (quoting PAUL R. RICE ET AL.,
ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:49, at 266 (2d ed. 1999))).
30. See Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 38–39
(Mass. 2007) (finding legal advice from in-house counsel to government entity and its
employees was protected “under the normal rules of the attorney-client privilege”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 cmt. b, 573–74 (1998)
(“The privilege aids government entities and employees in obtaining legal advice founded on
a complete and accurate factual picture.”); Anthony B. Joyce, The Massachusetts Approach to
the Intersection of Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege and Open Government Laws, 42
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attorney-client privilege protection for communications with in-house
counsel.31 Yet, whether application of the privilege to in-firm consultations
regarding a current client complies with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct has been a topic of much debate.32
Lawyers’ ethical obligations are outlined in various state apadtations of the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.33 Unlike
the attorney-client privilege, which applies only the context of litigation, Rules
of Professional Conduct apply to all lawyers in all contexts.34 The emergence
of in-house counsel in law firms warrants particular focus on Model Rules 1.6,
1.7, and 1.10.35
Model Rule 1.6 details an attorney’s ethical obligation of confidentiality.36

SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 957, 960 (2009) (“The SJC’s ruling [in Suffolk Constr. Co.] solidified the
governmental attorney-client privilege in Massachusetts . . . .”).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
in-firm privilege for associates assigned to internal investigation); Hertzog, Calamari &
Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co., 850 F. Supp. 255, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (preserving privilege
for communications between firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel); Lama Holding Co. v.
Shearman & Sterling, No. 89-Civ-3639(KTD), 1991 WL 115052 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding
privilege attaches to in-firm communication so long as in-house counsel is designated as
such).
32. Compare Asset Funding Grp., LLC v. Adams & Reese, LLP, Civil Action No. 072965, 2008 WL 4948835, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2008) (denying in-firm privilege in
current-client context), Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007
WL 578989, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (denying in-firm privilege in current-client
context), Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying in-firm privilege in current-client context), Koen Book Distribs. v.
Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284–85
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (denying in-firm privilege in current-client context), In re Sunrise Sec. Litig.,
130 F.R.D. 560, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (denying in-firm privilege in current-client context), and
SonicBlue Inc. v. Portside Growth & Opportunity Fund, Bankr. Nos. 03–51775, 03–51776,
03–51777, 03–51778–MM, 2008 WL 170562, at *10 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008)
(denying in-firm privilege in current-client context), with TattleTale Alarm Sys. v. Calfee,
Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10–cv–226, 2011 WL 382627, at *4–10 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3,
2011) (preserving privilege in current-client context), St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter,
Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 108 (Ga. 2013) (preserving privilege in currentclient context), Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(preserving privilege in current-client context), MLA City Apartments LLC v. DLA Piper
LLP (US), 967 N.E.2d 424, 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (preserving privilege in current-client
context), and RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080
(Mass. 2013) (preserving privilege in current-client context).
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2012) (identifying purpose of
rules).
34. See id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (“The attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or
otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client.”); see also Leonard Packel,
Confidentiality Under the Pennsylvania Attorney-Client Privilege Statutes and the New
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 VILL. L. REV. 91, 92 (1989) (“[T]he
Privileges and Rules are aimed at different audiences.”).
35. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1077–80 (discussing these three rules in
context of in-firm privilege). For further discussion on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court’s analysis of these rules in relation to in-firm privilege, see infra notes 110–16 and
accompanying text.
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (outlining lawyers’ confidentiality
obligations).
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Rule 1.6(a) requires that, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client . . . .”37 Where the attorney-client privilege protects
only confidential communication made for the purpose of procuring legal
advice, Rule 1.6 protects all information “relating to representation.”38 Thus,
Rule 1.6 also “protects knowledge which the lawyer has acquired from sources
other than communications.”39 Rule 1.6(b) grants exceptions to the rule,
however, when lawyers seek legal advice for purposes of ensuring their
compliance with the Model Rules, or defending themselves against a client’s
claim.40
The exceptions that Rule 1.6(b) provides, which ultimately allow a lawyer
to reveal client information when seeking certain legal advice, become
controversial when the lawyer seeks such advice from a law firm’s in-house
counsel.41 Rule 1.7 provides that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”42 The rule states that
a conflict of interest exists if “(1) the representation of one client will be
directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
37. Id. at R. 1.6(a) (precluding lawyers from revealing client information related to
representation); see also Sue Michmerhuizen, Confidentiality, Privilege: A Basic Value in
Two Different Applications, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP. (May 2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/confi
dentiality_or_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf (“A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer
relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal
information relating to the representation. . . . This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark
of the client-lawyer relationship.” (alteration in original) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2)).
38. See Packel, supra note 34, at 95 (discussing “communications” as narrower than
“information”).
39. Id. at 97 (illustrating difference between communication protected by privilege
versus communication protected by Rule 1.6). Professor Packel provides a thoughtful
example of this distinction:
[A]ssume that the client had been released on bail and that the lawyer were to
suggest to the client that she would like to see his records relating to the incidents
involved in the case. The client suggests that he will pick up the lawyer and drive
her to the place where he has the records. The lawyer is picked up and sees that the
client has driven her to a home in New Jersey. It is obvious when they arrive that
the client is living at the home. The lawyer’s observations would give her
“information,” but that information would not be learned through
“communications” and, therefore, would not be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. The Rules, however, would protect that information.
Id. (providing example of Rule 1.6’s broad protection over all information relating to
representation).
40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4)–(5) (providing exceptions to
Rule 1.6(a), which precludes attorneys from revealing information related to client’s
representation).
41. See Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 821 (“[C]ourts have
essentially fashioned a conflict of interest exception to the attorney-client privilege . . . in the
law firm context.”).
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (describing ethical duty to avoid
conflict of interest).
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responsibilities to another client . . . or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”43
Rule 1.7 becomes especially relevant to in-firm privilege cases through
imputation under Rule 1.10.44 Rule 1.10(a) states, “[w]hile lawyers are
associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any
one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule
1.7 . . . .”45 Under this analysis, when a client threatens malpractice and the
accused attorney consults in-house counsel on the matter, the law firm violates
Rule 1.7 because it is representing both the outside client and itself as a client,
and these two “clients” possess adverse interests.46
B. Off to a Shaky Start: Early Applications of In-Firm Privilege Point
Towards a Need for Reconstruction
The question of in-firm privilege first surfaced in the late 1980s.47 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was the
first court to decide a claim of in-firm privilege in Sunrise.48 In Sunrise, the
law firm of Blank Rome represented Sunrise Savings and Loan Association.49
Because Sunrise was insolvent, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation and Sunrise depositors sued Blank Rome.50 During discovery,
Blank Rome claimed the attorney-client privilege for internal communications
between the firm and its in-house counsel.51 While the court in Sunrise

43. Id. at R. 1.7(a)(1)–(2) (defining conflict of interest).
44. See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1078 n.8
(Mass. 2013) (noting that courts implicitly apply Rule 1.10 in abrogating privilege under
conflict of interest theory).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (describing imputation rule); see
also Chambliss, supra note 4 at 1747–48 (“The primary reasons for imputation are to ‘[give]
effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law
firm’ and to prevent the misuse of confidential information by lawyers in the same firm.”
(alteration in original) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt. 2)).
46. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1078–79 (explaining traditional invocation
of imputation through Model Rules in current-client cases).
47. See Richmond, Internal Investigations, supra note 25, at 77–78 (“Law firms’
ability to invoke the attorney-client privilege . . . to protect the results of their internal
investigations has been an issue since the 1980s, when firms that represented failed financial
institutions found themselves embroiled in litigation resulting from those institutions’
demise.”).
48. See In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 569 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (analyzing infirm privilege claim); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1728 (recognizing Sunrise as first
decision analyzing claim of in-firm privilege).
49. See In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 562 (describing nature of Blank Rome’s
representation).
50. See id. (explaining initial source of litigation).
51. See id. at 594 (“Blank Rome withholds 31 documents on the basis that they reflect
requests for legal advice made by Blank Rome to Blank Rome attorneys or outside counsel.”
(footnote omitted)). Moreover, Blank Rome divided the documents it sought to withhold into
four categories: (1) “post-suit documents” where the firm acted as its own counsel; (2) “postsuit documents” where the firm was relying on outside counsel; (3) “post-suit documents”
concerning the firm’s “continued representation of savings & loan associations generally”;
and (4) documents pertaining to the firm’s representation of Sunrise Savings. See id. (listing
four categories of documents).
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recognized the possibility of in-firm privilege “in some instances,” it hesitated
to extend protection to Blank Rome’s communications because of a potential
conflict of interest between the firm’s two clients, i.e., the original client and the
firm itself.52
The court eventually concluded that the interest “in protecting clients who
may be harmed by such a conflict of interest” outweighed the interest in
preserving the privilege for the law firm’s communications with in-house
counsel.53 Relying on Valente v. PepsiCo,54 the Sunrise court held that a law
firm’s communications with in-house counsel are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege “if the communication implicates or creates a conflict of interest
between a law firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and its client seeking to discover
the communication.”55
After the Sunrise decision, several courts adopted its reasoning, citing it as
the “seminal case” for in-firm privilege.56 The Sunrise court’s mere
recognition that a law firm may, in some instances, protect its internal
52. See id. at 595 (“I am now persuaded that it is possible in some instances for a law
firm, like other business or professional associations, to receive the benefit of the attorneyclient privilege when seeking legal advice from in house counsel.”). For a discussion of how
other courts have interpreted the Sunrise court’s acknowledgment of the “possibility” of infirm privilege, see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
53. In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 595–96 (framing question as balancing of interests).
But see RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080–81 (Mass.
2013) (preserving attorney-client privilege for in-firm communications).
54. 68 F.R.D. 361, 368–69 (D. Del. 1975) (denying privilege in conflict between
majority and minority shareholders). In Valente, the minority shareholders of Wilson
Sporting Goods brought a class action suit arising from Wilson’s merger with PepsiCo. See
id. at 364. At the time of the merger, PepsiCo owned seventy-four percent of Wilson’s stock
and Peter DeLuca, PepsiCo’s general counsel, sat on Wilson’s board of directors. See id.
Through DeLuca, PepsiCo conducted research analyzing the financial and tax consequences
of various merger strategies. See id. at 365.
When Wilson’s minority shareholders sought to discover this information, PepsiCo
resisted on attorney-client privilege grounds. See id. at 366. Yet, the Valente court rejected
PepsiCo’s claim to privilege and declared the information discoverable, stating that, “[i]t is a
common, universally recognized exception to the attorney-client privilege, that where an
attorney serves two clients having common interests and each party communicates to the
attorney, the communications are not privileged in a subsequent controversy between the
two.” Id. at 368 (citations omitted) (invoking “common interest” exception).
55. In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 596–97 (“Because I find that the Valente Court’s wellreasoned analysis accommodates the interest of both the . . . attorney and the . . . client, I will
adopt it as the controlling rule in this case.”). But see RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1081
(“[C]ompelled disclosure of . . . communications with ethics counsel . . . does little to advance
the interests of the client (who is owed disclosure of material facts whether or not the first
attorney has consulted counsel), but does much to undermine the important societal goals
served by the attorney-client privilege.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
56. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1721 (“In re Sunrise is the leading case on the
current-client issue.”); see also Roy Simon, In-House Ethics Consultations and the AttorneyClient Privilege: Case Law, N.Y. PROF’L RESP. REP., Jan. 2009, at 1 (referring to Sunrise as
“Granddaddy Case” of in-firm privilege and providing descriptions of cases following its
holding).
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communications has led several courts to uphold in-firm privilege outside of the
current-client context.57 However, seizing on the conflict of interest concerns
articulated in the decision, the majority of courts have instead utilized Sunrise to
circumvent the privilege in current-client cases.58 The two most widely cited
cases reinforcing Sunrise are Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais
(Suisse), S.A.59 and Koen Book Distributors v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan,
Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C.60
In 2002, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York addressed the current-client issue in Bank Brussels.61 In Bank Brussels,
the law firm of Roger & Wells consulted the chair of its ethics committee after
its client, Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) (CLS), threatened to sue the firm.62 The
ethics committee conducted an “internal review” of the firm’s representation of
CLS.63 CLS eventually filed suit and sought discovery of these internal
communications; however, the firm resisted, claiming the attorney-client
privilege.64 The Bank Brussels court rejected the firm’s claim to privilege,
reasoning that “[a]sserting the privilege against a current client seems to create
an inherent conflict against that client.”65 The court cited Sunrise favorably in
holding that the firm could not invoke the privilege against a current client for

57. See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
in-firm privilege for associates assigned to internal investigation); Hertzog, Calamari &
Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co., 850 F. Supp. 255, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding privileged
communications between firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel); Lama Holding Co. v.
Shearman & Sterling, No. 89 Civ. 3639 (KTD), 1991 WL 115052, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17,
1991) (holding privilege attaches to in-firm communication so long as in-house counsel is
designated as such); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1732 (discussing broad protection
for in-firm communication in non-client cases).
58. See, e.g., Asset Funding Grp., LLC v. Adams & Reese, LLP, Civil Action No. 072965, 2008 WL 4948835, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 2008) (declining to apply privilege due to
conflict between firm’s fiduciary duties to itself and to client); Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v.
Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL 578989, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (rejecting
in-firm privilege based on fiduciary relationship and conflicting interest between client and
lawyer); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting in-firm privilege); Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman,
Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284–85 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(rejecting in-firm privilege); SonicBlue Inc. v. Portside Growth & Opportunity Fund, Bankr.
Nos. 03-51775, 03-51776, 03-51777, 03-51778-MM, 2008 WL 170562, at *9 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (holding law firms cannot assert privilege against client when
communications arise out of self-representation on conflict of interest grounds).
59. 220 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
60. 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
61. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1736 (explaining that Bank Brussels was first case
to decide current-client issue after Sunrise).
62. See Bank Brussels, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (noting that CLS’s vice president
threatened “that if CLS were found liable to the RCA Banks, R & W would be liable to
CLS”).
63. See id. (describing internal review process).
64. See id. at 285 (explaining early stages of litigation).
65. Id. at 287 (finding Roger & Wells had ethical duty to disclose results of its internal
investigations to CLS and thus, Roger & Wells was in no position to claim privilege).
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internal communications made during representation.66
Only a few months after Bank Brussels, the in-firm privilege issue made its
way back to Pennsylvania in Koen Book.67 In Koen Book, the client, Koen
Book Distributors, informed its attorneys at Powell Trachtman that it was
considering filing a malpractice suit against the firm.68 Yet, despite expressing
its dissatisfaction with Powell Trachtman, Koen Book Distributors continued to
employ the firm for well over a month.69 During this time, the accused
attorneys consulted with another lawyer at the firm about the legal and ethical
implications of their client’s threatened malpractice action.70 When Koen Book
Distributors eventually sued the firm and sought to compel discovery of Powell
Trachtman’s internal communications, the firm resisted on attorney-client
privilege grounds.71 The court relied on the reasoning of Sunrise and Valente
in holding that the firm “owed a fiduciary duty to [the] plaintiffs while they
remained clients” and that “[t]his duty is paramount to [the firm’s] own
interests.”72

66. See id. at 287–88 (ordering Roger & Wells to produce documents related to its
internal review of representation of CLS).
67. See generally Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman
& Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (addressing in-firm privilege).
68. See id. at 284 (describing client’s threat of malpractice). Notably, the court does
not disclose reasons why the client became dissatisfied with the firm. See id. (stating only that
Koen Book Distributors was “dissatisfied”). It is clear, however, that Koen Book Distributors
retained Powell Trachtman for advice concerning a security interest from one of its customers,
Crown Books Corporation. See id. (explaining nature of representation). Furthermore, when
Crown Books went bankrupt, Powell Trachtman represented Koen Book Distributors in the
bankruptcy proceedings. See id. (noting representation extended to bankruptcy proceedings).
69. See id. (acknowledging Koen Book Distributors’ continued reliance on Powell
Trachtman’s services after threatening malpractice). In addition to retaining Powell
Trachtman from July 9, 2001 (the date malpractice was threatened) to August 13, 2001 (the
date representation was terminated), Koen Book Distributors also consulted with another law
firm concerning the quality of Powell Trachtman’s services. See id. (noting that client
retained other counsel).
70. See id. (describing Powell Trachtman’s internal communications from July 9, 2001
to August 13, 2001).
71. See id. at 283 (declaring firm withheld documents under attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrines).
72. Id. at 286 (rejecting privilege for Powell Trachtman’s in-firm communications).
The court employed the reasoning of Sunrise, declaring “to the extent that the seeking or
obtaining of legal advice by one lawyer from another lawyer inside the firm ‘implicates or
creates a conflict of interest,’ the attorney-client privilege between the lawyers in the firm is
vitiated.” Id. at 285 (quoting In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
Despite its discussion endorsing Sunrise, the Koen Book court named Valente as the
“seminal case.” See id. (citing Valente v. PepsiCo, 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975)). Relying
on Valente, the court determined the proper analysis to be whether Powell Trachtman created
a conflict of interest when it conducted its internal communications while representing Koen
Book Distributors. See id. (“It is a common, universally recognized exception to the attorneyclient privilege, that where an attorney serves two clients having common interest and each
party communicates to the attorney, the communications are not privileged in a subsequent
controversy between the two . . . .” (quoting Valente, 68 F.R.D at 368)).
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Despite the fact that the firm was threatened with malpractice only two
weeks before the client’s bankruptcy hearing, the court in Koen Book stated that
the firm could have withdrawn as counsel to “[a]void or minimize the
predicament in which it found itself.”73 The court further suggested that the
firm could have sought the client’s consent to continue representation “after full
disclosure and consultation.”74 Nevertheless, because neither “alternative” was
pursued, the court ordered production of the firm’s internal communications.75
Koen Book and Bank Brussels are only two of several current-client cases
where courts have relied upon the reasoning of Sunrise to abrogate in-firm
privilege.76 Courts in other states—including Washington, California, and
Louisiana—have also employed exceptions to the attorney-client privilege
based on Sunrise.77 Yet, as the influence of Sunrise expanded, critics began to
question the decision’s foundation: Valente.78 These critics have asserted
several different theories as to why these decisions constitute an inappropriate
basis for deciding in-firm privilege.79 Some commentators have argued that
Valente is factually distinguishable, so its reasoning is inapplicable to in-firm
privilege cases.80 Other commentators have contended that Sunrise, as an
73. Id. at 286 (indicating that Powell Trachtman could have withdrawn from
representation). The court expressed some sympathy for Powell Trachtman, acknowledging
the firm was threatened with malpractice just one week before Koen Book Distributors’
bankruptcy hearing. See id. (recognizing Powell Trachtman’s “unenviable situation”).
74. Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)).
75. See id. (rejecting privilege for firm’s communications).
76. See Simon, supra note 56 (discussing Sunrise’s expansive influence). For a further
discussion of cases relying on Sunrise, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
77. See Simon, supra note 56 (illustrating cases from different jurisdictions relying on
Sunrise). For a further discussion of approaches adopted by courts in these jurisdictions, see
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently analyzed the fiduciary exception to the
attorney-client privilege, explaining that, “English courts first developed the fiduciary
exception as a principle of trust law in the 19th century.” United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2321 (2011) (discussing trust law origins of fiduciary exception).
Moreover, the Court described the exception’s traditional application, stating that, “[t]he rule
was that when a trustee obtained legal advice to guide the administration of the trust, and not
for the trustee’s own defense in litigation, the beneficiaries were entitled to the production of
documents related to that advice.” Id. For a discussion of how the fiduciary exception has
been applied to law firm in-house counsel, see infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
78. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1736 (“[W]riters have criticized Valente as the
foundation for In re Sunrise. Yet despite the problems with Valente and Sunrise, Sunrise has
become the touchstone for the current-client analysis.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 829 (“In the end, Valente simply does not
support abrogating the attorney-client privilege . . . in law firm internal investigations. Cases
relying on Valente are therefore inapposite.”).
79. For a further discussion of commentators criticizing Sunrise and Valente, see infra
notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
80. See Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 829 (“Valente is irrelevant to
privilege disputes involving law firms’ internal communications because of the context in
which that case arose.”). Richmond emphasizes that, for the Valente court, a “key factor” in
finding DeLuca’s memorandum discoverable was that his “knowledge as PepsiCo’s general
counsel could not be separated from his knowledge as a Wilson board member.” Id. at 828
(citing Valente v. Pepsico, 68 F.R.D. 361, 368 (D. Del. 1975)). Richmond argues that this
“key factor” has nothing to do with the current-client cases because “[t]here was no showing
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application of Valente, neglects to consider in-house counsel’s duty to the firm,
which ultimately undermines the value of in-firm counsel.81
Given the recent exposure of Sunrise’s weak foundation, courts and critics
alike are advocating for a reconstruction of the in-firm privilege analysis.82 In a
positive development, a handful of recent district and appellate court decisions
have declined to follow Sunrise by preserving the privilege for in-firm
communications concerning a current client’s threat of malpractice.83
Ultimately, with several jurisdictions at odds on the issue of in-firm privilege,
the legal profession has long anticipated direction from higher courts.84
III. STRAYING FROM THE BLUEPRINT: THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT CHOOSES FUNCTION OVER FORM IN RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was the first court of
ultimate jurisdiction to consider the issue of in-firm privilege.85 The court
rejected commonly invoked exceptions to the attorney-client privilege by
protecting a law firm’s communications with in-house counsel regarding a

in any of those cases that the law firms’ counsel had the same sort of relationships with their
clients that DeLuca had with Wilson.” Id.
81. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1744 (asserting that Sunrise disposes of privilege
based on firm’s duty to client alone without considering in-house counsel’s duty to its law
firm). Professor Chambliss argues that Sunrise as an application of Valente results in an
approach that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn, which
“emphasizes the role of in-house counsel in promoting organizational compliance with law.”
Id. at 1743 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981)).
82. See TattleTale Alarm Sys. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10–cv–226,
2011 WL 382627, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011) (“[G]iven the fact that Valente has been
questioned by other courts as well, it seems reasonable to conclude that any decision which
relied upon Valente . . . which appears to be the way that Koen Book Distributors interpreted
it—merits a closer look.”); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1740 (arguing for approach to
in-firm privilege that balances interests of firms and clients).
83. See, e.g., TattleTale Alarm Sys., 2011 WL 382267, at *4–10 (rejecting older case
law abrogating privilege and holding in-firm communications protected); Garvy v. Seyfarth
Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (preserving privilege for in-firm
communications); MDA City Apartments LLC v. DLA Piper LLP (US), 967 N.E.2d 424,
429–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (relying on Garvy and upholding in-firm privilege).
84. See generally Rhodes & Tran, supra note 8 (discussing “great debate” concerning
in-firm privilege and warning lawyers to take caution regarding in-firm communications while
such uncertainty exists).
85. See Joan C. Rogers, Massachusetts High Court Backs Privilege for Consults with
Firm’s In-House Counsel, 82 U.S. L. WK. 121, 121 (2013) (“The opinion marks the first
decision by any state’s top court recognizing the in-firm privilege”). Although the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was the first U.S. court of last resort to recognize the
in-firm privilege, Georgia followed suit the next day. See St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v.
Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 108 (Ga. 2013) (holding attorney-client
privilege and work product protection attached to law firm communications regarding client’s
possible malpractice claims).
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current client’s threat of malpractice.86 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court’s decision will impact the ethical and evidentiary standards governing
lawyers and the legal profession.87
A. Facts and Procedure
In RFF Family Partnership, plaintiff RFF Family Partnership (RFF) made
a $1.4 million commercial loan to Link Development.88 To ensure the loan was
secured by Link Development’s real property, RFF retained defendant Burns &
Levinson to investigate the title.89 When Link Development defaulted on its
payments, Burns & Levinson initiated foreclosure proceedings in land court on
behalf of RFF.90
One day before the foreclosure sale, another assignee emerged seeking to
enjoin the foreclosure on the theory of superior title.91 Although the judge
denied the assignee’s motion to enjoin, the assignee persisted in the claim.92
RFF’s title insurer hired the law firm of Prince Lobel Tye (Prince Lobel) to
represent RFF in the land court proceedings, while Burns & Levinson continued
to represent RFF in connection with the post-foreclosure sale.93
One year later, while Burns & Levinson was still actively representing RFF
in negotiations for sale of the foreclosed property, Prince Lobel sent Burns &
Levinson a notice of claim alleging legal malpractice for the firm’s failure to
identify the existing mortgage on Link Development’s property.94 Prince Lobel
86. See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080
(Mass. 2013) (refusing to apply fiduciary and current-client exceptions). For a discussion of
the court’s reasoning on this topic, see infra notes 106–16 and accompanying text.
87. See generally Debra Squires-Lee & R. Victora Fuller, Measures to Take Following
‘RFF Family Partnership,’ MASS. LAW. WKLY. (July 18, 2013), http://masslawyersweekly
.com/2013/07/18/measures-to-take-following-rff-family-partnership/ (discussing implications
for attorneys following RFF Family Partnership).
88. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1068 (discussing nature of relationship
between RFF and Link Development).
89. See id. (explaining scope of legal services Burns & Levinson provided to RFF).
90. See id. (noting that representation continued throughout foreclosure proceedings).
91. See id. (describing assignee’s motion to enjoin foreclosure); see also 33
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW § 8:20 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining
theory of superior title under Massachusetts law).
92. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1068 (“[T]he assignee continued to press its
claim in the Land Court that its lien was superior to RFF’s and that the foreclosure was
therefore invalid.”).
93. See id. (illustrating that RFF was represented by Prince Lobel and Burns &
Levinson for separate issues).
94. See id. (recounting contents of notice of claim sent by Prince Lobel). The notice of
claim alleged that Burns & Levinson “breached its obligations to RFF by . . . failing to
identify and payoff an existing mortgage of record in favor of another lender, failing to record
a subordination agreement for another existing mortgage of record, and failing to inform RFF
of . . . outstanding liens.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Prince Lobel further alleged
that RFF “suffered and continues to suffer damages [because of] B & L’s legal malpractice
and breach of contract” and insisted Burns & Levinson reimburse RFF for such losses. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Prince Lobel attached to the notice of claim a draft of a
complaint alleging two counts of liability against Burns & Levinson and two against the
attorneys who had worked with RFF. See id. (describing draft of complaint).
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demanded that Burns & Levinson respond to its notice of claim within six
days.95 Two days after receiving the notice of claim, the accused attorneys
sought advice from Burns & Levinson’s in-house ethics advisor.96 Following
this consultation, the attorneys sent a letter to RFF providing notice of intent to
withdraw representation.97 Upon receiving this letter, RFF contacted Burns &
Levinson, insisting that Prince Lobel’s notice of claim was unauthorized and
that RFF still desired Burns & Levinson’s representation in the foreclosure
Prior to continuing representation, Burns & Levinson
negotiations.98
demanded and later received written confirmation from RFF that it did not
engage Prince Lobel to bring a malpractice claim against Burns & Levinson.99
Nonetheless, once representation concluded, RFF sued Burns & Levinson
alleging malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional
misrepresentation.100 Burns & Levinson subsequently moved for a protective
order to keep privileged its communications with in-house counsel regarding
the notice of claim from Prince Lobel.101 The Superior Court granted the
defendants’ motion for a protective order, whereupon RFF appealed.102

95. See id. (providing that RFF had from March 2, 2011 to March 8, 2011 to respond to
Prince Lobel).
96. See id. at 1068–69 (describing in-house counsel’s purpose “to respond to ethical
questions and risk management issues on behalf of B & L”). The court emphasized that
David Rosenblatt, a partner at Burns & Levinson, was specifically designated as in-house
counsel. See id. at 1070, 1080 (implementing condition for in-firm privilege that in-house
counsel must be formally or informally designated as such). The court also recognized that
Rosenblatt had never worked on RFF’s case and that the firm did not bill RFF for the firm’s
risk management communications. See id. at 1069 (discussing scope of Rosenblatt’s position
and lack involvement with RFF’s case).
97. See id. at 1068–69 (implying Burns & Levinson’s in-house counsel recommended
withdrawing as counsel). The letter, sent by Michael MacClary, one of the attorneys accused
of malpractice, to Robert F. Freedman, RFF’s principal, read:
As I am sure you are aware, we have received [the notice of claim] from your
counsel . . . contemplating a law suit against our firm. Additionally, you have
significant unpaid legal fees and have not made a payment to us for several months.
Under these circumstances, we cannot continue representing you. Accordingly, we
are withdrawing from further representation effective immediately.
Id. at 1069 (quoting letter sent to RFF).
98. See id. at 1069 (acknowledging that Freedman reached out to Burns & Levinson for
further representation despite Prince Lobel’s notice of claim).
99. See id. (noting that RFF’s principal provided written confirmation requested by
Burns & Levinson).
100. See id. (explaining that action filed by RFF in Superior Court was against Burns
& Levinson and its two individual attorneys that had represented RFF).
101. See id. (summarizing Burns & Levinson’s argument for preserving attorney-client
privilege for internal communications).
102. See id. (“The judge allowed the B & L defendants’ motion for a protective order
to the extent that he allowed B & L’s attorney to instruct Davidson, MacClary, Perkins, and
Rosenblatt not to answer questions that would reveal the content of the privileged
communications among them regarding the notice of claim.”). The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts also emphasized that it transferred RFF’s appeal to its court on its own motion.
See id. at 1069–70.
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B. The Court’s Decision in RFF Family Partnership: A “Form Follows
Function” Approach to In-Firm Privilege
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court’s
order protecting the attorneys’ communications with in-house counsel from
In preserving the attorney-client privilege for Burns &
discovery.103
Levinson’s internal communications, the court rejected “dysfunctional”
exceptions to the privilege.104 Additionally, the court limited its holding by
imposing four conditions on the applicability of the in-firm privilege.105
1.

Refusing to Follow Form: The Court Rejects the Fiduciary and CurrentClient Exceptions to Privilege

The state supreme court began its analysis of the “fiduciary” and “currentclient” exceptions to privilege by acknowledging that neither exception had
previously been recognized in Massachusetts.106 After a thorough analysis of
the fiduciary exception’s origins in trust law, the court declined to decide
whether Massachusetts should adopt the exception on the grounds that it would
not apply in the current matter.107 According to its traditional usage, the
fiduciary exception does not apply in cases where the trustee obtains legal
advice at the trustee’s own expense and for the trustee’s own protection.108
Because Burns & Levinson’s internal communications were for the firm’s own
defense in litigation and were billed to the firm, rather than to RFF, the court
103. See id. at 1081 (affirming Superior Court).
104. See id. at 1075, 1080 (refusing to apply fiduciary and current-client exceptions).
For a discussion of the court’s reasoning on this topic, see infra notes 106–16 and
accompanying text.
105. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080–81 (imposing four conditions for
privilege to apply). The court recognized that not all communications made in the law firm
environment are protected by the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 1080 (declaring in-firm
privilege “is not without its limits”). For further discussion on the four conditions, see infra
notes 117–22 and accompanying text.
106. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (“Although Massachusetts law
recognizes several exceptions to the attorney-client privilege . . . the law of the
Commonwealth has not yet recognized either of the proposed exceptions.” (citation omitted)).
Massachusetts recognizes six exceptions to privilege: (1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud; (2)
Claimants Through Same Deceased Client; (3) Breach of Duty or Obligation; (4) Document
Attested by an Attorney; (5) Joint Clients; and (6) Public Officer or Agency. See MASS. R.
EVID. § 502(d)(1)–(6) (listing situations when attorney-client privilege does not apply).
107. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1075 (holding fiduciary exception does not
apply). For a discussion of the fiduciary exception’s origins and traditional applications, see
supra note 77.
108. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (citing United States v. Jicarilla
Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2321 (2011)) (noting that fiduciary exception does not apply
where trustee procures legal advice for its own protection). Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court recently emphasized the probative value of determining who incurred
expenses in fiduciary exception cases. See Jicarilla, 131 S. Ct. at 2322 (“That the advice was
obtained at the beneficiaries’ expense was not only a ‘significant factor’ entitling the
beneficiaries to see the document but also ‘a strong indication of precisely who the real clients
were.’” (quoting Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. Ch.
1976))). For a further discussion of Jicarilla, see supra note 77.
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declared the fiduciary exception inapplicable.109
Next, the court refused to adopt the current-client exception, deeming it a
“flawed interpretation of the rules of professional conduct that yields a
dysfunctional result.”110 The court rejected the Sunrise line of authority on the
grounds that its reasoning contained two “fundamental flaws.”111 First, the
court noted that most decisions employing the current-client exception do so by
implicitly applying the conflict of interest rules through imputation under
Model Rule 1.10(a).112 While imputation generally precludes attorneys in the
same firm from representing outside clients that are adverse to one another, the
court found no evidence to support the assertion that Rule 1.10 prohibits inhouse counsel from providing legal advice to its own firm regarding a currentclient matter.113 Second, “black-letter law” provides that even when an

109. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1076 (“[A] client is not entitled to . . .
communications [that] were conducted for the law firm’s own defense against the client’s
adverse claims.”). Moreover, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissed RFF’s
proposition that the fiduciary exception excluded from the attorney-client privilege not only
confidential communications between the attorneys and in-house counsel but also their
confidential communications with outside counsel. See id. at 1075–76 (“This proposed rule
would be the most dysfunctional of all because it would deny a law firm and its attorneys any
protection provided by the attorney-client privilege . . . .”). Furthermore, the court deemed the
fiduciary exception “draconian” and unnecessary “to protect the interests of clients.” Id. at
1076 (explaining that preserving privilege does not affect lawyer’s duty to provide client full
and fair disclosure of facts relevant to representation).
110. Id. at 1080 (“We do not believe that the conflicts rules . . . were intended to
prohibit ethics consultation when it is most helpful: during client representation.” (alteration
in original) (quoting N.Y. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 789 (2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
111. See id. at 1078 (rejecting reasoning of current-client exception).
112. See id. at 1078 n.8 (“Although none of the courts that have applied the ‘current
client’ exception explicitly acknowledges that it is relying on the rule of imputation, most
implicitly do so . . . .”); see also Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A.,
220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (“[I]t is common knowledge that a conflict as to
one attorney at a firm is a conflict as to all.”); Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1745 (“According
to the logic of In re Sunrise et al., a conflict of interest must be imputed to firm in-house
counsel regardless of the structure of the in-house position or the facts of the representation at
issue.”). In RFF Family Partnership, the court explained that, under the imputation analysis,
Burns & Levinson’s in-house counsel represented the firm in defending RFF’s threatened
malpractice claim; however, applying Rule 1.10(a), in-house counsel would also be deemed to
represent RFF. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1077 (applying imputation to Burns &
Levinson).
113. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1078 (highlighting imputation rule’s lack
of reference to advice from in-house counsel). Moreover, the court states that it would be
nonsensical to apply the rule of imputation in the current-client context because the rule’s
rationales would not be furthered in doing so. See id. (“The primary reasons for imputation
are to [give] effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice
in a law firm and to prevent the misuse of confidential information by lawyers in the same
firm.” (alteration in original) (quoting Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1747–48) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). But see Zitrin, supra note 14 (“It is obviously counterintuitive that
a law firm has more protection in representing itself adversely to its own client than it would
representing a third party, and in fact Rule 1.10 says nothing of the sort.”).
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attorney fails to avoid a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7, the communications
remain privileged notwithstanding the attorney’s misconduct.114 The court
declared that this law applies even when the “client” is a law firm and the
“attorney” is the firm’s in-house counsel.115 The court also noted that the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers identifies thirteen possible
sanctions for a law firm’s breach of Rule 1.7, none of which mention disclosure
of otherwise privileged communications.116
2.

Design with Necessary Limitations: The Court Imposes Four Conditions
for In-Firm Privilege to Apply

Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between a firm’s
attorneys and its in-house counsel, the court limited its ruling by imposing four
conditions to be met before the privilege can apply.117 First, the firm must
designate a lawyer or lawyers within the firm to represent the firm as in-house
or ethics counsel.118 Second, in the event that a current client threatens
litigation against the firm, the in-house counsel must not have worked on that
that client’s case or any “substantially related matter.”119 Third, the time
dedicated to consultation with in-house or ethics counsel cannot be billed to the
client.120 Fourth, as with all client consultations, the in-firm communications

114. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1079 (“‘[T]he black-letter law is that when
an attorney (improperly) represents two clients whose interests are adverse, the
communications are privileged against each other notwithstanding the lawyer’s misconduct.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE Inc., 493 F.3d 345, 369
(3d Cir. 2007))).
115. See id. (finding that disclosure of attorney-client communications would be
inappropriate sanction for Burns & Levinson).
116. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6, at
65–66 (2000)). The court noted that “[w]ith the exception of the final catch-all remedy of
entering an ‘other sanction,’ none of these remedies includes disclosure of otherwise
privileged communications.” Id. at 1079; see also id. at 1079 n.11 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6, at 65–66 (2000)) (listing remedies under
Restatement).
117. See id. at 1080–81 (“Such a rule . . . is not without its limits . . . .”); see also
Barbara S. Gillers, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege for the Advice of a Law Firm’s
In-House Counsel, 2000 PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 107, 111 (recommending that firms take
precautionary measures to preserve in-firm privilege).
118. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (providing that designation of inhouse or ethics counsel can be either formal or informal); see also Gillers, supra note 117, at
111 (urging firm managers to “[i]dentify specifically the lawyers in the firm who will give the
firm legal advice in the matter”).
119. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (explaining second condition for
privilege to apply); see also Gillers, supra note 117, at 111 (“Distinguish between the firm
lawyers who are the clients and the firm lawyers who are the counsel. Those who are counsel
to the firm should have no involvement in the underlying matters.”).
120. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“Because the law firm is the client
with respect to such communications, their cost must be borne by the law firm.”); see also
Gillers, supra note 117, at 111 (“Set up a separate billing number for the matter in which the
in-house lawyer acts as the firm’s lawyer. Time should be billed to that number as it would be
to a client.”).
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must remain confidential.121 Because each of these four conditions was “either
properly found . . . or undisputed,” the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed the lower court’s ruling allowing Burns & Levinson to preserve the
confidentiality of its communications with in-house counsel.122
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: THE COURT IN RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP PROVIDES A
FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK THAT BENEFITS LAWYERS AND CLIENTS ALIKE
By preserving the attorney-client privilege for in-firm communications
concerning current clients, the RFF Family Partnership court provided the
functional framework the legal profession had been waiting for.123 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision has elicited approval from
courts, commentators, and even the American Bar Association.124 Unlike the
previous in-firm privilege decisions, the court provided a clear analysis and
considered real world implications throughout its decision.125 Moreover, the
court limited its holding to ensure the privilege applies only where
121. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“[A]s with all attorney-client
communications, they must be made in confidence and kept confidential.”); see also Gillers,
supra note 117, at 111 (“Inform partners and employees who are interviewed by the
designated counsel that their cooperation is necessary to assist counsel in giving legal advice
to the firm, that their communications with the designated attorneys are confidential, and that
the communications should be kept confidential.” (emphasis added)).
122. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080–81 (affirming lower court’s ruling
because four conditions were satisfied). Compare St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter,
Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 108 (Ga. 2013) (imposing four elements for infirm privilege), with RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080–81 (imposing four conditions
for privilege to apply). In St. Simons Waterfront, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the
attorney-client privilege applies to communications between a law firm’s attorneys and its inhouse counsel regarding a client’s threatened malpractice where:
(1) [T]here is a genuine attorney-client relationship between the firm’s lawyers and
in-house counsel; (2) the communications in question were intended to advance the
firm’s interests in limiting exposure to liability rather than the client’s interests in
obtaining sound legal representation; (3) the communications were conducted and
maintained in confidence, and (4) no exception to the privilege applies.
St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 108 (requiring all four elements be satisfied for privilege
to apply).
123. See Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 1 (discussing Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court’s clear guidance).
124. See, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 108 (recognizing in-firm privilege
after RFF Family Partnership); see also ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 15 (“It is in
the public interest for the law to encourage and facilitate the use of law firm in-house counsel
and, by this resolution, the American Bar Association recognizes that client representation
will be advanced by permitting confidential consultation in this manner.”); Fields, supra note
15 (applauding Massachusetts’s decision).
125. See Rogers, supra note 85, at 121 (“‘[T]here was an almost solid wall of federal
trial court decisions denying privilege . . . . But those decisions failed to consider important
lines of authority . . . that have now been utilized in . . . RFF Family Partnership.’” (quoting
William T. Barker, Partner, Dentons)); see also Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 1
(“The SJC provided clear guidance to law firms about when and under what circumstances the
privilege would apply.”).
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appropriate.126
By refusing to allow “legal doctrine [to] trump functionality,”
Massachusetts has developed a practical analysis for in-firm privilege that
improves law firm efficiency and law firm adherence to ethical rules.127
Because these nuanced improvements ultimately benefit both lawyers and their
clients, it would behoove jurisdictions following Sunrise to draw upon
Massachusetts’s framework as a model for modernizing their in-firm privilege
analyses.128
A. Public Reaction to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s Holding:
What About the Client?
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s holding in RFF Family
Partnership has triggered much debate about whether the decision properly
reconciles the interest in preserving the privilege with the ethical obligations
attorneys owe their clients.129 Members of the legal profession have supported
Massachusetts’s in-firm privilege analysis stating that the decision “will result
in the provision of better legal services both to clients and the law firms that
serve them.”130 Conversely, one author on legal ethics concluded that, “courts
ruling this way are simply protecting the interests of lawyers over those of
clients, and that is inexcusable.”131 Moreover, the Association of Corporate
Counsel (ACC) has expressed disagreement, stating “[l]aw firms owe their
clients a profound duty of loyalty under the ethics rules . . . . It is this duty of
loyalty that prohibits law firms from claiming a privilege to let them hide
information from existing clients.”132
However, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s holding should not
be interpreted as an unchecked extension of privilege that benefits law firms
alone.133 Rather, the RFF Family Partnership ruling is broad enough to
126. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (limiting holding to apply only if
four conditions are met); see also Gillers, supra note 117, at 111 (recommending “careful not
casual” approach for attorney communications with in-house counsel).
127. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (refusing to join other jurisdictions in
adopting exceptions to privilege); see also infra notes 133–45 and accompanying text
(highlighting improvements resulting from Massachusetts’s decision).
128. See Fields, supra note 15 (noting that decision is fair for lawyers and prudent for
clients).
129. Compare Zitrin, supra note 14 (arguing RFF Family Partnership benefits lawyers
over clients), with Fields, supra note 15 (arguing RFF Family Partnership is fair for lawyers
and clients alike).
130. Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 1 (approving of Massachusetts’s decision
in RFF Family Partnership).
131. Zitrin, supra note 14 (arguing RFF Family Partnership allows lawyers to be
disloyal to their clients).
132. ACC Files Amicus Brief with the Oregon Supreme Court in Crimson Trace Legal
Malpractice Case, ASS’N CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/
newsroom/pressreleases/acc-files-amicus-oregon-supreme-court-in-crimson.cfm
(asserting
position in opposition to Massachusetts’s decision in RFF Family Partnership).
133. See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080
(Mass. 2013) (“[A]pplying the privilege in such contexts will often benefit the client and will
likely result in increased law firm compliance with ethical obligations . . . .”).
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encourage law firm use of in-house counsel for current-client issues but is
sufficiently limited to ensure the privilege will apply only where appropriate.134
By achieving this balance, the court in RFF Family Partnership permits a more
efficient and ethical legal environment that serves the interests of lawyers and
clients alike.135
First, the court’s decision in RFF Family Partnership increases law firm
efficiency.136 The recognition of in-firm privilege eliminates the need for law
firms to secure outside counsel when issues with a current client arise.137
While it is clear this development saves firms time and money, it also ultimately
results in more timely legal advice for clients.138 Moreover, by allowing
attorneys to consult with in-house counsel prior to deciding whether to
withdraw from a client’s case, the RFF Family Partnership framework
mitigates potential harm to the client.139 For example, the Burns & Levinson
attorneys were in the middle of active negotiations for RFF when they received
the notice of claim.140 If the attorneys were required to withdraw as counsel at
the first inkling of malpractice, RFF would have likely suffered from the halted
foreclosure sale.141
134. See Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 2 (“The four-part formula
appropriately balances the concerns of clients and attorneys . . . .”).
135. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (discussing how framework of fourpart formula benefits lawyers and clients).
136. See id. at 1074 (finding that attorneys are not required to retain outside counsel or
withdraw unnecessarily when current-client issues arise); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at
1747 (“Requiring the firm to obtain outside counsel or withdraw from the representation also
does not serve the interests of the outside client. Certainly, the client is not better off if the
firm retains outside counsel.”).
137. See TattleTale Alarm Sys. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10–cv–226,
2011 WL 382627, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011) (“While consultation with outside counsel
might be a fair substitute in some cases, by the time a matter has progressed to the point where
outside counsel are called in, it may be too late to protect the client from damage.”); RFF
Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (rejecting RFF’s argument that outside counsel was
“practical alternative” for Burns & Levinson); see also ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at
15 (“Any distinction between in-house and outside counsel in this regard elevates form over
substance.”).
138. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (“[A]part from the additional cost to
the law firm, [retaining outside counsel] may delay the receipt of the ethical advice because
new counsel will need to be retained and the new counsel’s law firm will need to complete its
own conflicts check.”).
139. See id. (noting that withdrawing prematurely does not adequately protect client
interests); see also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1747 (“[T]he client’s interest may be seriously
harmed by encouraging the firm to withdraw at the first hint of a problem because withdrawal
limits the firm’s opportunity (and incentive?) to mitigate harm to the client.” (citing Anthony
E. Davis, Professional Responsibility: Multijurisdictional Practice, Internal Discussions,
Counsel’s Advice, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2003, at 3)).
140. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1068 (noting Burns & Levinson was
actively representing RFF in foreclosure sale when Burns & Levinson received Prince Lobel’s
notice of claim).
141. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1747 (discussing potential harm to client when
attorneys withdraw from representation before mitigating harm).
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Second, the court’s decision in RFF Family Partnership fosters a more
ethical law firm environment.142
By assuring attorneys that their
communications will remain protected, the court’s decision facilitates complete
candor with in-house counsel.143 This reassurance essentially eliminates any
“chilling effect,” thereby encouraging lawyers to raise issues they might
otherwise conceal or ignore.144 This collaborative effort ultimately provides
clients with better-informed advice and the reassurance that their lawyers are
maintaining ethical standards in their work.145
B. Massachusetts’s Framework as a Model for Jurisdictions Needing
Renovation
While many courts have simply followed the majority by adopting
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege in cases where a current client is
involved, the court in RFF Family Partnership refused to blindly rely on
existing precedent.146 Rather, the court constructed an innovative framework

142. See ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 15 (“[T]he attorney-client privilege for
consultations with in-house counsel is critical to ensuring that attorneys and other law firm
personnel receive the best possible advice on complicated legal and ethical issues.”); see also
Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Ethics Practice, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112 (2003) (noting principal effect of in-house ethics counsel is to
“keep ethics issues in the forefront . . . .”). Peter Jarvis and Mark Fucile further assert that the
particular attention paid to ethics issues through in-house counsel influences the culture of the
firm in at least three overlapping ways:
A firm that expressly devotes personnel to ethics issues is telling its lawyers that it
cares about those issues and their resolution; a firm with readily available and userfriendly ethics resources makes it easier for its attorneys to comply with the rules
and to avoid taking imprudent or unnecessary risks; firm morale is improved when
lawyers know they can get reliable help when they need it.
Id. (describing in-house ethics counsel’s influence on firm culture).
143. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (acknowledging that “sugar-coating”
would occur if attorneys consulted in-house counsel without the guarantee of privilege); see
also Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1754 (“[E]ven well-meaning clients need the privilege to
encourage them to reveal questionable conduct and voice their fears about liability.”).
144. See TattleTale Alarm Sys. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10-cv-226,
2011 WL 382267, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011) (highlighting importance of reassuring
attorneys that their communications will remain confidential through preservation of in-firm
privilege). The court in TattleTale further reasoned that “[i]f . . . lawyers believe that these
communications will eventually be revealed to the client in the context of a legal malpractice
case, they will be much less likely to seek prompt advice from members of the same firm.”
Id.
145. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1765 (discussing benefits of in-house ethics
counsel for firm and clients). Furthermore, Professor Chambliss argues that encouraged use
of in-house counsel has day-to-day benefits outside the arena of malpractice litigation, stating
that, “[i]n the long run, clients collectively stand to benefit far more from firms’ investment in
in-house counsel than from sporadic access to in-firm communication in lawyer-client
disputes.” Id.
146. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1074–80 (declining to join other
jurisdictions that allow “legal doctrine to trump functionality”). For a further discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 147–51 and accompanying text; see also Barker, supra note 24, at
471 (noting that flawed reasoning in Valente has become foundation for unsound case law,
and urging courts to reconsider its application).
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that preserves the privilege while still respecting the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.147 However, Pennsylvania’s rigid approach to in-firm
privilege makes achieving this balance impossible.148 Under Koen Book,
Pennsylvania firms cannot even protect their communications with outside
counsel from discovery if the communications involve a current client’s
threatened malpractice action.149 Given the unfortunate and expansive
influence of Sunrise, this dysfunctional approach is not just isolated to
Pennsylvania but exists within several other jurisdictions.150
These
jurisdictions relying on Sunrise should reconstruct their approaches to in-firm
privilege in light of RFF Family Partnership.151
Massachusetts’s framework provides an in-firm privilege analysis that
values real world implications over existing precedent.152 Unlike the court in
147. See Chambliss, supra note 4, at 1740 (advocating for frameworks governed by
ethical rules and traditional privilege analysis); see also Fields, supra note 15 (discussing
Massachusetts’s framework in context of Model Rules).
148. See Barker, supra note 24, at 470–71 (critiquing Pennsylvania’s approach under
Koen Book). Barker dissects Pennsylvania’s in-firm privilege analysis in Koen Book, stating,
“Koen Book[] suggests that the lawyers should withdraw to permit defense preparations. But
a lawyer who has not been discharged cannot withdraw without taking actions necessary to
prevent prejudice to the client and, if the representation is before a tribunal, without the
tribunal’s permission.” Id. at 470 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16
(2003)). Barker argues that, for both of these reasons, the lawyers in Koen Book “probably
could not have withdrawn until completion of the bankruptcy hearing.” Id.
149. See Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 831 (criticizing Koen
Book’s in-firm privilege analysis as flawed and rigid).
150. See Simon, supra note 56 (naming Sunrise as “seminal” in-firm privilege case and
describing six cases relying on its ruling). For a further discussion of jurisdictions employing
the reasoning of Sunrise, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
151. See Fields, supra note 15 (expressing hope that Massachusetts’s decision will
influence other courts to recognize in-firm privilege). Moreover, the legal profession is
projected to see wider recognition of in-firm privilege with the added support of the American
Bar Association’s most recent resolution. See Rogers, ABA Formally Backs Privilege, supra
note 14 (“[T]he new policy will provide a strong footing for ABA advocacy on the issue [of
in-firm privilege].”). The ABA Resolution provides:
The ABA strongly supports the preservation of the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine as essential to maintaining the confidential relationship
between client and attorney required to encourage clients to discuss their legal
matters fully and candidly with their counsel so as to (1) promote compliance with
law through effective counseling, (2) ensure effective advocacy for the client, (3)
ensure access to justice and (4) promote the proper and efficient functioning of the
American adversary system of justice.
ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 3 (supplying ABA’s stance on in-firm privilege).
152. See RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1073,
1080 (Mass. 2013) (providing implications for RFF’s proposed alternatives). Counsel for
RFF argued that attorneys faced with a malpractice claim by a client have four practical
alternatives: (1) withdraw from the representation “without first consulting with better
informed and more dispassionate in-house ethics counsel”; (2) advise the client of the conflict
(without first consulting with in-house counsel), and ask for the client’s consent to consult
with in-house counsel; (3) confer with in-house counsel without pursuing the two previously
listed alternatives and accept the risk the communications could be discovered; or (4) retain
outside counsel. See id. at 1073–74 (proposing alternatives).
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Koen Book, which unquestioningly relied on a colleague’s opinion in Sunrise,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court thoroughly analyzed the origins and
applications of the fiduciary and current-client exceptions along with their
harmful implications.153 In doing so, the court’s rejection of both exceptions
aligns with that of several commentators who believe these exceptions stem
from poorly reasoned case law.154 By declining to follow form over function,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court diminished the credibility of these
older decisions and instead conveyed precisely how abrogating in-firm privilege
can produce dysfunctional results for lawyers and their clients.155
Moreover, the Massachusetts framework ensures that the privilege applies
only in appropriate circumstances.156 While attorneys deserve candid and
confidential access to in-house counsel just like anyone else, the court in RFF
Family Partnership recognizes the harm that could result from an overbroad
extension of in-firm privilege.157 By limiting its holding, the court essentially

The court rejected RFF’s argument that its proposed courses of action constituted
“practical alternatives.” See id. at 1073. Regarding the first alternative of suggesting
withdrawal, the court stated that, “[this] alternative poses the risk that a law firm, without the
benefit of expert advice, may unnecessarily withdraw from a representation where the
apparent conflict was illusory or reparable, or withdraw without adequately protecting the
client’s interests.” Id. at 1074. The court also rejected the second alternative, stating that it
“poses the risk that the law firm may advise the client about the conflict before itself obtaining
the advice that would enable it better to understand the conflict.” Id. As for the third
alternative, suggesting the attorney accept the risk of discovery, the court stated that it could
result in “the information provided to in-house counsel [being] withheld or ‘sugar-coated’
because of the risk of disclosure to the client, and the advice received will suffer from the lack
of candor.” Id. In response to RFF’s fourth alternative, the court found it to be expensive and
noted that it “may delay the receipt of the ethical advice because new counsel will need to be
retained and the new counsel’s law firm will need to complete its own conflicts check.” Id.
The court rejected each of the alternatives as “dysfunctional,” because none of the options
best served the interests of the client or the firm. See id. (justifying rejection of alternatives).
153. See id. at 1074–80 (analyzing origins and applications of fiduciary and currentclient exceptions); see also Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle,
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 284–85 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“My colleague, Judge
Thomas O’Neill, faced a like issue a number of years ago in [In re Sunrise].” (citation
omitted)).
154. See Rogers, supra note 85, at 121 (“‘[T]here was an almost solid wall of federal
trial court decisions denying privilege . . . . But those decisions failed to consider important
lines of authority . . . that have now been utilized in . . . RFF Family Partnership.’” (quoting
William T. Barker, Partner, Dentons)). Regarding these poorly-reasoned cases, attorneys
commenting on RFF Family Partnership have noted that “[a]nyone seeking to rely on the old
federal cases must now grapple with [RFF Family Partnership] and the previously overlooked
lines of authority on which they were based.” Id. (predicting that it will be difficult to rely on
older case law barring in-firm privilege after RFF Family Partnership).
155. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“[F]orm should follow function, and
we prefer a formulation of the attorney-client privilege that encourages attorneys faced with
the threat of legal action by a client to seek the legal advice of in-house ethics counsel . . . .”).
156. See id. (“For the privilege to apply, four conditions must be met.”).
157. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder
Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 817, 846 (1984)
(“Those who have fiduciary responsibility often want legal advice concerning their
responsibilities. They should have the same opportunity to consult with counsel and to speak
freely and without fear of making admissions as any other clients.”). But see Gillers, supra
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minimized the risk that in-firm communication will result in ethical
violations.158 For example, the conditions imposed in RFF Family Partnership
better define the attorney-client relationship between a firm’s attorneys and inhouse counsel, thereby lessening the likelihood of impermissible conflicts of
interest under Model Rule 1.7.159 Moreover, the conditions also require that all
communications remain confidential thereby reinforcing the disclosure
rationales articulated by Rule 1.6.160
Lastly, the court in RFF Family Partnership reiterated the need for such
conditions by acknowledging that “not every attorney in a law firm is its inhouse counsel and not every communication within a law firm is privileged.”161
By effectively isolating the application of in-firm privilege to appropriate
circumstances, the court also upheld the rationale conveyed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Upjohn:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all.162
By implementing four conditions for privilege, the court in RFF Family
Partnership provides the certainty and predictability required by Upjohn.163
note 117, at 108 (“A casual approach [to privilege], however, is risky: Just because lawyers
consult lawyers, the privilege is not necessarily preserved.”).
158. See Gillers, supra note 117, at 111 (urging firms to take precautionary measures
for in-firm communication to ensure compliance with ethical rules).
159. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (requiring in-house counsel to be
designated as such, to have not preformed work on client’s matter, and to bill in-house
communications to firm); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2012)
(outlining lawyers’ obligation to avoid impermissible conflicts of interest); Squires-Lee &
Fuller, supra note 87, at 1 (discussing four conditions and suggesting practice management
pointers for ensuring privilege applies).
160. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“[A]s with all attorney-client
communications, they must be made in confidence and kept confidential.”); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (precluding disclosure of confidential information relating
to client’s representation).
161. RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (justifying need for limited holding).
162. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (expressing need for
clarity as to when privilege applies).
163. See id. (refusing to adopt privilege analysis that resulted in “disparate decisions”).
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of certainty in privilege throughout its
analysis of the “control-group test” as applied within the context of a corporation’s
communications with in-house counsel. See id. The Court rejected the test because its past
applications “illustrate[d] its unpredictability.” See id.
The Massachusetts decision affirms the rationale of Upjohn by providing four clear
conditions for in-firm privilege to apply. See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080
(cautioning that “not every communication within a law firm is privileged” and implementing
four conditions); see also Rogers, supra note 85, at 121 (“‘[T]he opinion imposes four
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V. CONCLUSION

Fortunately for lawyers and their clients, Massachusetts’s framework for
in-firm privilege has already proved influential in other states.164 Just one day
after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s decision in RFF Family
Partnership, Georgia’s Supreme Court followed suit by preserving the attorneyclient privilege for in-firm communications concerning a current client.165
While these decisions are a significant step for in-firm privilege, the reality
is that they only constitute controlling authority in Massachusetts and
Georgia.166 In many jurisdictions, it remains unclear whether the attorneyclient privilege protects discussions with in-house ethics counsel involving
current-client matters.167 Even worse, in Pennsylvania, and states adopting its
precedent, attorneys’ conversations with in-house counsel remain unprotected if
they fall within the current-client context.168 Nevertheless, with the American
Bar Association’s recent endorsement of both Massachusetts’s and Georgia’s
decisions, the legal profession remains hopeful that in-firm privilege will soon
be widely recognized.169

realistic practical requirements to insure that the privilege will apply only in appropriate
cases.’ These four requirements ‘should serve as a list of best practices for law firms that
want to insure that their communications with in-house counsel remain protected’ . . . .”
(quoting Richard M. Zielinski, Director, Goulston & Storrs)).
164. See, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C.,
746 S.E.2d 98, 102 (Ga. 2013) (recognizing in-firm privilege one day after Massachusetts);
see also Fields, supra note 15 (noting that both courts identified similar circumstances under
which confidential communications between attorneys and in-house counsel are protected).
165. See St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 108 (“[T]he attorney-client privilege
applies to communications between a law firm’s attorneys and its in-house counsel regarding
a client’s potential claims against the firm . . . .”).
166. See Squires-Lee & Fuller, supra note 87, at 2 (describing jurisdictional
limitations).
167. See id. (acknowledging uncertainty in many jurisdictions).
168. See Richmond, Essential Principles, supra note 22, at 831 (criticizing
Pennsylvania’s approach under Koen Book). For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s infirm privilege precedent, see supra notes 47–84 and accompanying text.
169. See ABA Resolution 103, supra note 15, at 15 (“It is in the public interest for the
law to encourage and facilitate the use of law firm in-house counsel and, by this resolution,
the American Bar Association recognizes that client representation will be advanced by
permitting confidential consultation in this manner.”).
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